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Gao: Fair Use and Computer Programming

THE SWORD OF DAMOCLES: HOW THE FAIR USE DEFENSE
APPLICATION AFFECTS THE COMPUTER PROGRAMMING
AREA
Ziyi Gao

I. INTRODUCTION
The invention and popularity of electronic devices and
computer programming has rapidly changed our lives. The software
on computers and phones brings human life to a new era, makes
people’s lives more convenient, and encourages people to express
their brilliant ideas. Software developers express their ideas through
writing lines of code, weave the code into software that can achieve
certain functions, which in turn makes people’s lives more colorful
and convenient when they use electronic devices. Copyright law is
dedicated to protecting creators’ rights while maintaining creativity.
However, technology companies should be aware of a Sword of
Damocles 1 hanging above their heads: copyright infringement. 2



J.D. Candidate, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Class of 2021. I
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1
Evan Andrews, What was the Sword of Damocles? HISTORY (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://www.history.com/news/what-was-the-sword-of-damocles. “The sword of
Damocles is now commonly used as a catchall term to describe a looming danger.”
2
Will Kenton, Copyright Infringement, INVESTOPEDIA (Jun. 12, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/copyright-infringement.asp.
“Copyright
infringement is the use or production of copyright-protected material without the
permission of the copyright holder.” Id.
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Fair use, as an affirmative defense, excuses unauthorized uses
from copyright infringement. 3 Its purpose is to “reconcile the
respective speech-suppressive and speech-protective positions.”4
However, the fair use defense is very confusing, especially when it is
applied in the software area, and thus it is hard for tech companies to
predict the courts’ decisions. 5 Although fair use can be analyzed
through four statutory factors, courts often struggle to resolve the
ambiguities in the statutory language and how to weigh the statutory
factors.6
Therefore, courts tend to have their own different
interpretations and standards, and they often disagree with each
other.7
This Note analyzes the fair use doctrine in the computer
programming area. Part II of the Note discusses the history of
copyright protection in the computer programming field and the fair
use doctrine. Part II. A i and ii addresses the software development
and intellectual property protection and merger doctrine in the
computer program area. Part II. A iii and iv reviews the software
copyright protection’s legislative history and copyright jurisprudence.
Part II. B discusses the background of the fair use doctrine. Part II. C
analyzes two representative cases involving fair use doctrine in the
software area in depth.

3

Eric J. Schwartz, Joking Aside: Recent Copyright Infringement Cases Reexamine
the Distinction between Satire and Parody in Determining Fair Use, 30-MAY L.A.
LAW 33 at *1 (2007).
4
Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 138
(2011).
5
Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47, 48-49 (2012).
6
Fair Use, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/intellectual-property/copyright/fairuse/(last updated Apr. 2018).
7
Id.; see, e.g., Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[t]o qualify as a fair
use under copyright law, a new work generally must alter the original with new
expression, meaning, or message”); Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170 (9th
Cir. 2013) (“an allegedly infringing work is typically viewed as transformative as
long as new expressive content or message is apparent, this is so even where—as
here—the allegedly infringing work makes few physical changes to the original or
fails to comment on the original”); Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756
(7th Cir. 2014) (questioning Second Circuit’s transformative use test set forth in
Cariou because ask exclusively whether the work is transformative will replace the
list in 17 U.S.C. § 107 and it would also override derivative works protection set
forth in 17 U.S.C. § 106(2)).
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In Part III, the Note comments on the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc. 8 This Note focuses
on Google’s fair use applicability issue. The Note argues that the
Court correctly incorporated the public benefit consideration into the
fair use doctrine yet failed to go further to provide detailed guideline
on how to consider the public benefit properly. Additionally, the
Note contends that the Supreme Court correctly held that Google’s
use was transformative, yet the Court should have provided a clear
definition of “transformative use.” Moreover, the Note states that the
Supreme Court correctly held that Google’s use did not harm
Oracle’s actual or potential markets. Finally, the Note calls for the
Court to provide a clear standard for weighing the four statutory fair
use factors.
II.

BACKGROUND
A.

Copyright protection in computer programming

The legislative history of the Copyright Act9 provides insight
into the interaction of copyright protection and the software industry.
i.

Software Development

Software is a tool for humans to instruct the computer how to
execute tasks.10 Software consists of data and various programming
instructions.11 The instructions are written by lines of code, which is
the way that computer programmers express their ideas.12 The
ultimate usage of software is to make computers execute tasks, which
makes the software capable not only of expressing ideas but also
serves a functional purpose. 13
8

886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
10
Micah Yost, A Brief History of Software Development, MEDIUM (Jan. 25, 2018),
https://medium.com/@micahyost/a-brief-history-of-software-developmentf67a6e6ddae0.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Ralph Oman, Computer Software As Copyrightable Subject Matter: Oracle v.
Google, Legislative Intent, And The Scope Of Rights In Digital Works, 31 HARV. J.
9
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Software has decades of history. Tom Kilburn wrote the first
software in 1948.14 The software industry has developed quickly
since the 1980s when personal computers were invented and then
became more accessible to society. 15 In the 1990s, the open-source
software entered the mainstream. 16 Open-source software can be
inspected, modified, and enhanced. 17 Students can use the opensource software to learn how to improve software, the source code
can inspire computer programmers, and even non-programmers can
benefit from the software by making changes and customizing it. 18
After mobile devices like smartphones entered the market and
became popular, applications used on mobile devices began to
explode.19 Today, almost everybody relies on computers and mobile
devices to work and socialize. 20 The software industry continues to
evolve, producing software and applications that make people’s lives
more convenient.
ii.

Intellectual Property protection for computer
programs and the merger doctrine

Technology has developed more rapidly than the law.
Policymakers struggled to create laws that would effectively protect
software work and protect the rights of developers and tech
companies.21 Intellectual property law protects authors’ rights in
their creative works that include literature, art, and musical

LAW
&
TECH.
639,
644
(2018),
https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/assets/articlePDFs/v31/31HarvJLTech639.pdf.
14
Yost, supra note 10.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
What is
open source?,
OPENSOURCE.COM
(Nov. 1, 2012),
https://opensource.com/resources/what-open-source.
18
Id.
19
Yost, supra note 10.
20
Kristen Herhold, How People Use Social Media in 2018, THE MANIFEST (Oct.
17, 2018), https://themanifest.com/social-media/how-people-use-social-media2018.
21
See Peter S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An updated epitaph for
copyright protection of network and functional features of computer software, 31
HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 305, 314 (2018).
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compositions.22 Software consists of lines of code written by an
engineer, making it a literary work. Thus, software easily falls into
the intellectual property system. 23
Patent law protects new inventions that are useful. 24 The goal
for computer programs is to serve a functional purpose; it makes
perfect sense to protect computer programs under patent law.
However, patent law application is thought to be time-consuming and
costly, and the period of protection is short. 25
Copyright law has long served as a tool to protect aesthetic
creativity.26 Copyright law protects “literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works.”27 However, the copyright does not protect any
“idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery.”28
Computer programs consist of a
programming “operation, concept, principle, or discovery.” 29
Considering the low application price, easy application process, and
long period of protection, computer programs are suitable for
copyright protection.30
However, fitting software into copyright protection can be
hard because of the difficulty of separating the functional from the
creative expression. Merger doctrine in the computer software area
was born in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.31
Under the merger doctrine, the expression of a particular idea is not
protected by copyright when there is effectively only one way or a
few ways to express that idea. 32 It can be used as a complete defense
22

See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
See Menell, supra note 21.
24
What
is
Patent
Law?,
FINDLAW
(June
20,
2016),
https://www.findlaw.com/hirealawyer/choosing-the-right-lawyer/patents.html.
25
See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39
STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1347-51 (1987).
26
See 17 U.S.C. § 102.
27
Id.
28
See id. § 102 (b).
29
See id.
30
Menell, supra note 21, at 314.
31
714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983).
32
See Lewis R. Clayton, COPYRIGHT LAW the Merger Doctrine, THE NAT’L L.J.
(June 6, 2005); Guodong Fu, GOOGLE V. ORACLE: Weighing Fair Use Factors
in Software Copyright Infringement Cases, 2020 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F.1, 4
(2020).
23
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to copyright infringement in computer program cases,33 or it can be
related to the copyrightability issue. 34 In the computer program area,
the idea/expression merger is not the only type of merger; courts have
also dealt with some process/expression mergers. 35 Merger doctrine
is critical in the case law relating to copyright protection in the
computer program area because computer programs have both a
literary nature, expressed by written code, and a utilitarian nature,
instructing computers to execute certain tasks. The merger doctrine
can make computer programs uncopyrightable because it is difficult
to distinguish between the expression and the idea or process.
iii.

Copyright legislative history

Faced with the dilemma of fitting software into copyright law
protection, Congress established the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) in 1974.36
CONTU’s purpose is to study issues arising from copyrighted works
in the software area and recommend revisions of federal intellectual
property law.37 As a temporary solution, Congress included software
within the scope of copyright protection in the Copyright Act of 1976
(1976 Act).38 However, the rest of the 1976 Act provisions
“maintained traditional exclusions of ideas and functional features.” 39
Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright’s Merger Doctrine, 63 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 417, 428 (2016); see Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 540-41 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that exact
copying excused on merger grounds because it was necessary for achieving
compatibility).
34
See, e.g., Kregos v. Assoc. Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).
35
See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 837-38
(10th Cir. 1993) (“[C]opyright protection is denied to expression that is inseparable
from or merged with the ideas, processes, or discoveries underlying the
expression.”); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) ( “[I]f the patentable process is embodied inextricably in the line-by-line
instructions of the computer program . . . the process merges with the expression
and precludes copyright protection.”).
36
Jule Sigall, Copyright Infringement was Never this Easy: RAM Copies and their
Impact on the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 45 CATH.
U.L. REV. 181, 187 (1995).
37
Id.
38
Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976), (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 17 U.S.C.).
39
See Menell, supra note 21, at 315.
33
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After careful consideration, CONTU concluded that the
computer software work should be protected under copyright law,
even though copyright law’s essential principle is not to protect any
idea.40 CONTU recommended two modest changes to the 1976 Act:
(1) defining a computer program as “a set of statements or
instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result”; and (2) allowing “the rightful possessor
of a copy of a computer program” to run the program and to make a
backup copy of the program without infringement liability. 41 The
CONTU Final Report further indicated that while “one is always free
to make a machine perform any conceivable process (in the absence
of a patent) . . . one is not free to take another’s program,” subject to
copyright’s limiting doctrines, originality, and the idea-expression
dichotomy.42
Congress agreed with CONTU and in its 1980 amendments to
federal copyright law, incorporated CONTU’s recommendation.43
The 1980 amendments defined the term “computer program” as “a
set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
computer in order to bring about a certain result.” 44 Congress
intended that software developers and tech companies could be
protected by copyright law for their “programming design and coding
choices to the extent that the expression was separable from the
underlying ideas while recognizing limitations on copyright
protection for computer programs.”45 In this way, the creative effort
in a software developing process gains protection from infringement,

40

Id.
FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGY USES OF
COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1979) http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/contu6.html
[hereinafter CONTU Final Report].
42
Id. Courts have treated CONTU’s Final Report as legislative history for the 1980
amendments to the 1976 Act. See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp.
714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d
255, 260-61 (5th Cir. 1988).
43
Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3007, 3028 (1980) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
44
17 U.S.C. §101.
45
See Peter S. Menell, API Copyrightability Bleak House: Unraveling and
Repairing the Oracle v. Google Jurisdictional Mess, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1515, 1521 (2016).
41
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whereas the underlying idea and “unoriginal programming choices
remain free for others to use.”46
iv.

Copyright jurisprudence

Courts struggled to identify the line between protected and
unprotected computer software. For example, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that “[c]omputer programs pose unique problems for the
application of the ‘idea/expression distinction’ that determines the
extent of copyright protection.”47 The court further noted that
“[t]here is no settled standard for identifying what constitutes a
protected expression and what constitutes an unprotected idea in
cases involving copyright infringement issues in computer software
because of the hybrid nature of computer programs.”48 This Note
analyzes some of the important copyright infringement cases in the
software area.
1.

Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, Inc.49

The owner of a dental laboratory hired a software firm to
design a computer program for the laboratory that would organize the
bookkeeping and administrative tasks. 50 Whelan, the principal
programmer, customized a computer program that runs on the
laboratory’s IBM Series One computer.51 According to the parties
agreement terms, Whelan would retain the copyright in the program,
and her company would use its best efforts to improve the program,
and the laboratory would use its best efforts to market the program.52
Later, one of the officers and shareholders of the laboratory created a
version of the program that could run on other computer systems and
started marketing the program. 53 Whelan sued the laboratory for

46

See Menell, supra note 21, at 315.
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992).
48
Id.
49
797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
50
Id. at 1225.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1226.
53
Id.
47
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copyright infringement.54 The district court held in favor of Whelan,
reasoning that both of the programs’ “structure and the overall
organization were substantially similar.” 55 The issue on appeal was
whether similarity in the overall structure of the programs triggered
copyright infringement.56
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals used “a single substantial
similarity inquiry according to which both lay and expert testimony
would be admissible.”57 The court suggested that:
[T]he purpose or function of a utilitarian work would
be the work’s idea, and everything that is not
necessary to that purpose or function would be part of
the expression of the idea. Where there are many
means of achieving the desired purpose, then the
particular means chosen is not necessary to the
purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea. 58
Using this standard, the Third Circuit held that the functionality of
the program was to “aid in the business operations of a dental
laboratory.”59 The structure of the program “was not essential to that
task,” for there were programs that existed that “perform[ed] the
same functions but have different structures.” 60 The structure of the
program, therefore, was part of the expression that was
copyrightable.61 The court’s single-step substantial similarity test has
been criticized by numerous cases for being too simplified and
overbroad.62
2.

Computer Associates International,

54

Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1228-29.
56
Id. at 1234.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1236 (citation omitted).
59
Id. at 1238.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 1239.
62
See, e.g., CMAX/Cleveland, Inc. v. UCR, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 337, 352 (M.D. Ga.
1992) (“Unfortunately, the simplicity that makes the test so attractive, also makes it
‘conceptually overbroad’ and ‘descriptively inadequate.’”); Comput. Assocs. Int’l.,
Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (criticizing Whelan test
as inadequate and inaccurate).
55
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Inc. v. Altai, Inc.63
Computer Associates (“CA”) developed and sold a program
named SCHEDULER, which was a job scheduling program designed
for IBM mainframe computers. 64 The program was successful partly
because it had a sub-program called ADAPTER that enabled
SCHEDULER to be compatible with “three operating systems:
DOS/VSE, MVS, and CMS.”65 The users can use SCHEDULER on
any of IBM’s three mainframes without the need to customize their
programs.66 In 1982, Altai, another computer software company,
began marketing its own job scheduling program named ZEKE. 67
Altai wanted to make an MVS version of ZEKE and decided that the
best way to achieve this goal was to introduce a “common system
interface” component into ZEKE, and the new component-program
was named OSCAR 3.4.68 Thirty percent of OSCAR’s code was
copied directly from CA’s ADAPTER program.69 After CA served
the summons and complaint on Altai, it immediately took action to
rewrite the program and developed OSCAR 3.5.70 Despite Altai’s
effort to rewrite OSCAR, CA sued Altai for copyright infringement. 71
At trial, the District Court focused on comparing the
similarities between ADAPTER and OSCAR 3.5.72 The most
important evaluation factor – code, “presents no similarity at all”
since Altai rewrote the program. 73 The court further found that “only
a few of the lists and macros were similar to protected elements in
ADAPTER.”74 The other similarities were either functional elements
or in the public domain, neither of which is protectable under
copyright law.75 The court ruled in favor of Altai because there was
63

982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 698.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 699.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 699-700.
69
Id. at 700.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 560-62 (E.D.N.Y.
1991).
73
Id. at 562.
74
Id.
75
Id.
64
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no substantial similarity between the two programs. 76 On appeal, CA
argued that the district court erred in ruling the OSCAR 3.5 and the
ADAPTER were not substantially similar. 77
To determine this issue, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
used the abstraction-filtration-comparison test.78 The court fleshed
out the framework of the three-step test:
In ascertaining substantial similarity under this
approach, a court would first break down the allegedly
infringed program into its constituent structural parts.
Then, by examining each of these parts for such things
as incorporated ideas, expression that is necessarily
incidental to those ideas, and elements that are taken
from the public domain, a court would then be able to
sift out all non-protectable material. Left with a kernel,
or possible kernels, of creative expression after
following this process of elimination, the court’s last
step would be to compare this material with the
structure of an allegedly infringing program.79
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision that the two systems were not substantially similar
by using Judge Pratt’s three-step analysis.80 Both courts
agreed that after OSCAR was rewritten, there was no
substantial similarity between the two programs’ parameter
lists and macros. 81 The Second Circuit also agreed with the
district court’s holding that the “overlap exhibited between
the list of services required”82 for two programs did not count
as substantial similarity because that was “dictated by the
nature of other programs with which it was designed to
interact and, thus, is not protected by copyright.”83 The
Second Circuit’s three-step test is a useful method to deal
76

Id.
Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 701 (2d Cir. 1992).
78
Id. at 706. The three-step test originated from Judge Learned Hand’s
“abstractions test” in Nichols v. Univ. Pictures, 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
79
Comput. Assocs., 982 F.2d at 706.
80
Id. at 715; see Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544.
81
Comput. Assocs., 982 F.2d at 714.
82
Id. at 715.
83
Id.
77
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with nonliteral expression copying and to separate the
unprotectable parts from the protectable ones, which is
necessary since it is meaningless and incorrect to compare
unprotectable parts to see whether the two software are
substantially similar.
3.

Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp.84

On March 17, 1988, Apple Computer, Inc. (Apple) filed claim
against Microsoft Corp. (Microsoft) for copyright infringement. 85
After Microsoft released Windows 1.0, Apple complained that it had
a similar graphical user interface (GUI) with Apple’s programs.86
The two companies then “agreed to a license, which gave Microsoft
the right to use and sublicense derivative works generated by
Windows 1.0 in current and future products.” 87 Subsequently,
Microsoft released Windows 2.0 and Windows 3.0; its licensee,
Hewlett-Packard Company (“HP”), introduced NewWave 1.0 and
NewWave 3.0 that “run in conjunction with Windows to make IBMcompatible computers easier to use.” 88 Apple sued Microsoft
because it believed that new versions exceeded the license scope and
thus infringed its copyright. 89 The license agreement Apple and
Microsoft signed in 1985 stated that Microsoft had the right to use the
“visual displays” generated by Apples’ GUI programs, which
appeared as derivative works in Windows 1.0. 90
At trial, the District Court analyzed the license visual displays
that were in the Windows interface. 91 The court “dissected the
Macintosh, Windows, and NewWave interfaces” to decide whether
they are copyrightable and found a handful of elements in NewWave
that were protectable.92 Finally, the court stated that it would
84

35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994).
Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp, 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1447 (N.D. Ca.
1991).
86
Apple v. Microsoft, 35 F.3d at 1438.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1440.
91
Id. at 1438.
92
Id.
85
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compare those protectable elements in NewWave with Apple
elements to find whether they are substantially similar, and it would
compare NewWave and Windows 2.0 and 3.0 as a whole with
Apple’s works for virtual identity. 93 The court held in favor of
Microsoft and HP.94
Apple contended that “visual display” was ambiguous, and
the license did not authorize Microsoft to make later Windows
versions look more like Apple’s programs than Windows 1.0
looked.95 Apple further contended that the district court erred by
using its dissection method, which was to “dissect the unlicensed
elements in order to determine whether remaining similarities lack
originality.”96 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Apple’s
argument based on the fact that Apple licensed the right to “copy
almost all of its visual displays” and “the limited number of ways that
the basic ideas of the Apple GUI can be expressed differently.” 97
The court noted that the GUI were partly artistic and partly
functional, which helped enhance the user’s communication with the
computer.98 Since the creativity of the GUI was restrained by the
power and speed of the computer, design alternatives would limit the
GUI’s function and make it harder to use.99
GUI audiovisual works can be analytically dissected using the
same process as used in other works.100 The court proposed a threestep test, similar to the Second Circuit’s test in Altai.101 After using
this dissection method, the district court held, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, that no copyright infringement had occurred.102 The threestep test is a useful method to separate the expressive and functional
93

Id.
Id.
95
Id. at 1440.
96
Id. at 1439.
97
Id. at 1442.
98
Id. at 1444.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 1445; see also Data East USA, Inc. v. EPYX, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir.
1988) (using analytical dissection to determine whether the similarities of the
audio-visual works embodied in video games resulted from unprotectable
expression).
101
Apple v. Microsoft, 35 F.3d at 1445; see Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai,
Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-11 (2d Cir. 1992).
102
Apple v. Microsoft, 35 F.3d at 1439-40.
94
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elements, thus providing expanded use in the area of software
copyright.
4.

Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland
International., Inc.103

In Lotus, Lotus Development Corp. (Lotus) had copyrighted
Lotus 1-2-3, a spreadsheet program. 104 It enabled users to perform
accounting functions on computers. 105 Lotus 1-2-3 also allowed
users to write “macros,” which enabled users to designate a series of
command choices without the need to type the whole series every
time the users tried to run certain commands.106
Borland
International Inc. (Borland) released the Quattro program, which
included the Lotus menu command hierarchy to make the Quattro
compatible with Lotus 1-2-3.107 Borland copied the “words and
structure of Lotus’s menu command hierarchy” but did not copy any
of Lotus’s computer codes, even though the Quattro and its later
versions looked virtually identical to the Lotus 1-2-3 menu tree.108
Borland offered users the “Lotus Emulation Interface,” which
allowed users to choose either Borland’s menu commands or Lotus’s
command structure.109
The District Court held that Lotus’s menu command hierarchy
was copyrightable expression because there were so many possible
alternate command words for the ten commands that appear in
Lotus’s main menu.110 After the District Court’s ruling, Borland
removed the Lotus Emulation Interface. 111 However, Borland’s
programs were still partially compatible with Lotus 1-2-3.112 After a
lengthy process, the district court ordered a permanent injunction
against Borland.113 Borland appealed and conceded it copied the
103

49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
Id. at 809.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 810.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 810-11.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
104
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Lotus menu command hierarchy but argued that Lotus’s 1-2-3 menu
command hierarchy was not protected under copyright law because
“it is a system, method of operation, process, or procedure” that is
covered by 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b).114
The First Circuit noted it was a “matter of first impression”
when deciding whether the Lotus command hierarchy was
copyrightable.115 This case was different from Altai and the threestep test was not applicable since the test was only useful when
dealing with nonliteral copying, but the case here involved Borland’s
literal copying of the Lotus menu command hierarchy.116 The First
Circuit held that the expression of Lotus was not copyrightable
because “it is part of Lotus 1-2-3’s ‘method of operation.’”117 The
court explained:
We think that “method of operation,” as that term is
used in §102(b), refers to the means by which a person
operates somethings, whether it be a car, a food
processor, or a computer. Thus, a text describing how
to operate something would not extend copyright
protection to the method of operation itself; other
people would be free to employ that method and to
describe it in their own words. Similarly, if a new
method of operation is used rather than described,
other people would still be free to employ or describe
that method.118
The court compared the Lotus menu command hierarchy to the video
cassette recorder (VCR), reasoning that the Lotus command terms
were equivalent to the buttons that control the VCR instead of the
label on the VCR buttons. 119 The First Circuit’s reasoning made
more sense than the district court’s decision, for although there could
be different ways to achieve the same goal (here, to execute
114

Id. at 812.
Id. at 813.
116
Id. at 814-15; see Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 70611 (2d Cir. 1992).
117
Id. at 816.
118
Id. at 815.
119
Id.
115
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commands), that does not necessarily mean that the way to achieve
this goal is expression. Using the First Circuit’s VCR example, the
buttons on the VCR could have different shapes, but fundamentally,
the buttons themselves are just the tool to “operate” the VCR.
There is no settled standard to determine the copyright
infringement issue in the computer programming area. When dealing
with nonliteral copying expression between programs, the three-step
test is very helpful, for it dissects the programs to separate
copyrightable parts from ones that are not. This makes it easier for
courts to compare the similarities between original and infringing
programs. When dealing with a literal copying issue, the three-step
test may not be so useful; courts should determine whether the
original program is copyrightable by deciding whether part or all of
the original program falls into subject matters that are not
copyrightable under section 102 (a). If so, there can be no copyright
infringement, even if literal copying occurred.
B.

The Fair Use Doctrine

Fair use is an affirmative defense that excuses unauthorized
users from copyright infringement. It was an English common law
doctrine that was carried over to the United States.120 There was no
legislative guidance for courts to apply the fair use defense. From the
very beginning of copyright protection, some of the fair use of
copyrighted materials had been considered necessary to fulfill
copyright’s purpose, “to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.”121 As Justice Story explained,
[I]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are,
and can be, few if any, things, which in an abstract
sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every
book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must
necessarily borrow, and use much which was well
known and used before.122

120

See WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 3-26 (2d
ed. 1995) (tracing the English common law roots of the fair use doctrine).
121
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (quoting U.S.
CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
122
Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4, 436).
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Lord Ellenborough expressed the necessity to protect copyright
material and to allow others to build upon it when he wrote, “while I
shall think myself bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of this
copy-right, one must not put manacles upon science.”123
The
Supreme Court looked at history and noted that “[E]nglish courts
held in some cases that in some instances ‘fair abridgment’ would not
infringe an author’s rights.”124 Although the First Congress enacted
the initial copyright statute without explicitly referring to “fair use,”
the doctrine was recognized by the American courts nonetheless.125
In Folsom v. Marsh,126 Justice Story examined earlier cases
and distilled the methodology of applying fair use defense, noting
that the courts should “look to the nature and objects of the selections
made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or
supersede the objects, of the original work.” 127 The fair use defense
remained a common law issue until Congress passed the 1976
Copyright Act, which states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or
by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom
use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of
a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors to
be considered shall include—
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

123

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 575.
Id.at 576; see Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105
(1990).
125
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576.
126
9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.4, 901).
127
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4, 901)).
124
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(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.128
Congress intended 17 U.S.C. § 107 “to restate the present
judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in
any way” and intended that courts continue the common-law tradition
of fair use adjudication.129 The fair use doctrine thus requires courts
to be more flexible when applying the fair use statute and avoid rigid
application when doing so would stifle the creativity the law is trying
to encourage.130 However, this is not to simplify the fair use doctrine
with bright-line rules, for the fair use doctrine calls for case-by-case
analysis.131 The statute’s use of terms “including” and “such as,” is
not meant to exclude other uses; it provides only general guidance
about the sorts of copyright that courts most commonly had found to
be fair uses.132 Also, when applying the fair use doctrine, courts will
not treat the four statutory factors in isolation. 133 The courts explore
all the factors and weigh the results together.134
In a fair use analysis, courts first consider “the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”135 The central
purpose of the inquiry is for courts to see whether the new work
merely “‘supersedes the objects’ of the original creation,” 136 or
instead “adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
128

17 U.S.C. § 107. In 1992, Congress amended § 107 of the Copyright Act to
make clear that “[t]he fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding
of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.” See
Fair Use of Copyrights Works, Pub. L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107).
129
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
130
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990).
131
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984).
132
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994).
133
Id. at 578.
134
Id.
135
17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
136
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.4, 901).
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message.”137 In other words, courts ask whether the new work is
“transformative.”138 Generally speaking, the transformative nature of
the work is the most important consideration: the more
transformative the new work, the less significant the other factors
will be, which may weigh against a finding of fair use.139 Even
though the courts do not have to necessarily find the work
transformative to hold it as fair use, transformative use will generally
further the copyright goal, which is to “promote science and the
arts.”140
The second factor courts consider is “the nature of the
copyrighted work.”141 This factor requires courts to recognize that
“some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection
than others, and thus fair use is more difficult to establish when the
former works are copied.”142 Generally speaking, the courts evaluate
the “value of the materials used.” 143 The more factual a plaintiff’s
original work is, the more likely the courts will find fair use.
However, this factor is not as important as other factors, for
unauthorized users almost always copy publicly known, expressive
works.144
The next factor is for courts to evaluate whether “the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole are reasonable in relation to the purpose of the
copying.”145
Courts inquire whether the alleged infringer’s
justification for the particular use is persuasive, and then the inquiry
relates back to the first statutory factor, since courts recognize that
the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and
character of the use.146 In Campbell, the Court emphasized that “this
factor calls for thought not only about the quantity of the materials
used, but about their quality and importance, too.”147
137

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
142
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas at 348).
143
Id.
144
Id. The Court referred particularly to parodies in Campbell.
145
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(3)).
146
Id. at 586-87.
147
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
138
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The final factor courts evaluate is “the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.” 148
Campbell explained that:
It requires courts to consider not only the extent of
market harm caused by the particular actions of the
alleged infringer, but also “whether unrestricted and
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the
defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse
impact on the potential market” for the original. 149
If evidence shows substantial harm to the market, courts may weigh
against parody work for fair use, since licensing of derivatives is also
an important economic incentive to the creation of originals.150

C.

Fair Use Application in Computer Programming
Regime

In computer program copyright infringement cases, the courts
do not have many chances to deal with the fair use defense. This Part
analyzes two representative software cases where the courts analyzed
the fair use defense.151
1.

Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.152

Sega Enterprises Ltd. (“Sega”) is a Japanese corporation that
developed and marketed video entertainment systems, including the
“Genesis console” and video game cartridges. 153 Sega licensed its
copyrighted computer code to independent computer game software
148

Id. at 590 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(4)).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (quoting 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright § 13.05 [A][4], p. 13-103.61 (1993)).
150
Id. at 593; see 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (copyright owner has rights to derivative
works).
151
See, e.g., Sony Comput. Ent., Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir.
2000); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
152
977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
153
Id. at 1514.
149
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developers.154 The licensees developed and sold Genesis-compatible
video games to compete with Sega. 155 Accolade, Inc. (“Accolade”)
was an independent developer, manufacturer, and computer
entertainment software marketer. 156 Although Accolade considered
entering into a licensing agreement with Sega, it eventually
abandoned the effort.157
To make its video games compatible with the Genesis
console, Accolade used a two-step process.158 First, it “reverse
engineered”159 Sega’s video game programs in order to learn the
requirements for compatibility with the Genesis console, and it
created a development manual, which contained the information it
had discovered in the reverse engineering process.160 Second,
Accolade created its own games for Genesis relying on the
development manual.161 In the second round of reverse engineering,
Accolade added the code from Sega to its development manual as a
“standard header file to be used in all games.” 162 The file contained
approximately twenty to twenty-five bytes of data.163 But Accolade’s
games contained a total of 500,000 to 1,500,000 bytes.164
In 1991, Sega sued Accolade claiming copyright
infringement.165 The district court held in favor of Sega and rejected
Accolade’s fair use defense. 166 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for

154

Id.
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
159
Brian Hess, What is Reverse Engineering and How Does it Work? ASTRO
MACHINES WORKS (Sept. 9, 2019), https://astromachineworks.com/what-isreverse-engineering/. Reverse engineering, also called backwards
155

engineering or back engineering, is the process by which an artificial
object is deconstructed to reveal its designs, architecture, code or to
extract knowledge from the object. Id.
160

Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1514-15.
Id. at 1515.
162
Id. at 1516.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 1517.
166
Id.
161
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the Ninth Circuit considered whether Accolade’s use constituted fair
use.167
The Ninth Circuit weighed four factors of the fair use defense
to determine whether Accolade had infringed Sega’s copyright. 168
Copying for commercial use creates a presumption of unfairness,
which can be rebutted by the particular commercial use.169 The court
rejected Sega’s argument that Accolade copied the code to produce a
competing product, and thus, was precluded from finding fair use,
holding that the court needed to consider other aspects of “the
purpose and character of the use” as well. 170 The court further
reasoned that although Accolade’s ultimate goal was to market
Genesis-compatible video games, it copied the code solely for
discovering the functional requirements to make the video games
compatible with the Genesis console. 171 This aspect of Sega’s
programs was not protected by copyright. 172 Since it is necessary for
Accolade to deconstruct the Sega’s video game programs to learn the
compatibility requirement and to make changes to its own games to
make them compatible with Genesis console, Accolade could use no
other methods to achieve this purpose since Accolade had never
entered into a licensing agreement with Sega.173
Further, the court recognized that particular use could bring
public benefit, which is what the Copyright Act intended to
promote.174 Accolade’s identification of “the functional requirements
for Genesis compatibility has led to an increase in the number of
independently designed video game programs offered for use with
the Genesis console.”175 Independent developers could thus develop
video games that can be used on Genesis’s console.176 As a result,
more video games would be compatible with the Genesis console and

167

Id.
Id. at 1520-27.
169
Id.; Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir.
1986).
170
Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1520-27.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Id. at 1523.
175
Id.
176
Id.
168

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/16

22

Gao: Fair Use and Computer Programming

2021

FAIR USE AND COMPUTER PROGRAMMING

979

known by consumers. Even if the Genesis-compatible games were
not scholarly works that did not alter the court’s judgment.177
As to the second factor, the court recognized that there was no
settled standard for identifying what is protected expression and what
is an unprotected idea in computer software copyright infringement
cases because of computer programs’ hybrid nature.178 The court did
not agree with the Third Circuit test in Whelan that the idea or
function of a computer program is the idea of the program as a whole,
and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function is part
of the expression of that idea, as this test was overbroad and too
simplistic.179 Instead, the court agreed with the Second Circuit’s test
set forth in Altai180 that breaks down a computer program into
component subroutine and then identifies each part’s core functional
element.181
The court agreed with Sega that Accolade “copied protected
expression.”182 However, the court also recognized that computer
programs are special, for people cannot gain access to the
unprotected ideas and functional concepts without disassembling the
code, and there is no viable alternative way to achieve this goal. 183
Thus, for the second factor, the court held in favor of Accolade,
because disassembling is necessary to learn the functional
requirements of the Genesis console compatibility. 184
As to the third factor, since Accolade disassembled entire
programs written by Sega, the court held against Accolade. 185
However, the court also noted that this factor alone does not preclude
a finding of fair use. Since the ultimate use was limited, the court did
177

Id.
Id. at 1524.
179
Id. at 1525; see, e.g., Peter Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright
Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1074 (1989); John
Englund, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of
Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV.
866, 881 (1990).
180
See Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-11 (2d Cir.
1992).
181
Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1525.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 1526.
185
Id.
178
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not weigh this factor too significantly in the whole fair use
analysis.186
As to the fourth factor, the court acknowledged that
Accolade’s use affected the market for Genesis-compatible games in
an indirect fashion.187 However, video game users typically purchase
more than one game, and therefore there is no basis to assume that
Accolade’s games have a significant impact on Sega’s games, since
customers may purchase both. 188 An attempt to monopolize this
market by making it impossible for others to compete is against the
statutory purpose to promote creative expression. 189 Thus, the court
ruled in favor of Accolade on this factor. 190
After weighing the four factors, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court’s decision in favor of Accolade.191 The court’s analysis
was correct and ensured that the fair use defense would not be overly
rigid. It did not simply apply the statutory text but considered
various facts such as the ultimate goal of Accolade’s copying; the
public benefit resulting from Accolade’s copying; and the fact that
Accolade’s copying would not have too much impact on Sega
because the consumers would buy more than one game. 192
2.

Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC 193

In the 1990s, Sun Microsystems, Inc. (Sun) developed the
Java platform, a software that can be used to “write and run programs
in Java programming language,” for computer programming. 194 With
Java, programmers did not have to rewrite programs when they want
to use the program on different computer hardware.195 The Java 2
Standard Edition (Java SE) of the platform included the Java
Application Programming Interface (API), which contained prewritten Java source code that allowed programmers to build certain
186

Id.
Id. at 1523.
188
Id.
189
Id. at 1523-24.
190
Id. at 1527-28.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 1523-24.
193
886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
194
Id. at 1186.
195
Id.
187
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functions without writing code from scratch. 196 By 2008, Java SE
included 166 API packages. 197 Although the Java programming
languages were free, some content spread across three packages
within Java API library must be used; otherwise, the language would
fail.198 In 2010, Oracle purchased Sun.199 Oracle made the Java
platform freely available to programmers, but to attract programmers,
Java was licensed with a fee to programmers who wanted to use the
APIs in competing platforms, including mobile devices.200
In 2005, Google acquired Android, Inc. to explore the mobile
devices market.201 That same year, Google tried to negotiate with
Sun to acquire a license, but the attempt failed. 202 At the same time,
the Android team attempted to create its own APIs but also failed. 203
In 2007, Google debuted its Android software platform for mobile
devices, in which Google copied the code of “37 Java API packages
– 11,500 lines of Oracle’s copyrighted code.”204
Oracle sued Google for copyright and patent infringement in
2010, and the Northern District of California ruled in favor of
Google.205 Oracle appealed to the Federal Circuit, which reversed the
case in part and remanded it to the district court in 2014.206 The
Federal Circuit held that the Java API packages were copyrightable,
and it remanded to the district court on the issue of whether Google’s
use was acceptable under the fair use doctrine. 207 Google appealed
the Federal Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court, but the writ of
certiorari was denied in 2015. 208 After a new trial in 2016, the jury
found Google did not infringe Oracle’s copyrighted Java API

196

Id.
Id.
198
Id. at 1187.
199
Id. at 1186.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 1188.
206
Id.; see also Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1381 (Fed Cir.
2014).
207
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1188; see Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339,
1376 (Fed Cir. 2014).
208
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1185.
197
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packages because of the fair use defense. 209 Oracle appealed to the
Federal Circuit in 2018, and the court reversed and remanded the case
to the district court.210 This time, the Federal Circuit held that
Google’s use was not fair use, and the court remanded the case to the
district court to decide the amount of money that Google should pay
Oracle.211 Google petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court
granted in 2019.212
Two substantive issues were presented to the Supreme Court:
(1) whether copyright protection extends to a software interface; and
(2) whether, as the jury found, Google’s use of a software interface in
the context of creating a new computer program constitutes fair
use.213 In the Federal Circuit court’s ruling in 2018, the court
weighed the four factors of fair use, holding that Google’s use of Java
API packages was not fair use. 214
For the purpose and character of the use factor, the Federal
Circuit recognized that the factor had two main components: (1)
whether the use was commercial in nature; and (2) whether the new
work was transformative. 215 Oracle also pointed out that courts have
included bad faith in the purpose and character analysis.216
Courts tend to find that a copyrighted use for commercial
purposes is typically not fair use.217 The Federal Circuit nonetheless
recognized that “the commercial use subfactor should not be unduly
emphasized for it would lead to an overly restrictive view of fair
use.”218 Thus, the court reasoned that “the degree to which the new
user exploits the copyright for commercial gain . . . affects the weight

209

Id. at 1189.
Id. at 1186.
211
Id.
212
See Andrew Hamm, Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc., SCOTUSBLOG (Apr.
29,
2019),
https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/google-llc-v-oracleamerica-inc/.
213
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 140 S. Ct. 520
(2019) (No. 18-956).
214
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1186.
215
Id.at 1196.
216
Id.
217
Id.
218
Id. at 1196-97 (quoting Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913,
921 (2d Cir. 1994)).
210

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/16

26

Gao: Fair Use and Computer Programming

2021

FAIR USE AND COMPUTER PROGRAMMING

983

we afford commercial nature as a factor.” 219 The Federal Circuit
disagreed with Google’s argument that its use was not commercial
because Android was available open-source.220 The court explained
that the fact that Android was free to the consumers did not make
Google’s use non-commercial, and Google’s other potential noncommercial motive did not matter here as a matter of law. 221 The
court also disagreed with Google’s argument that it did not gain
profit directly but through advertisements, 222 reasoning that “direct
economic benefit was not required to demonstrate commercial
use.”223 The Federal Circuit thus ruled in favor of Oracle on
commercial use.224
Google argued that its use was transformative because it used
small parts of the Java API packages to create a new smartphone
platform, a different market from Oracle’s computer field. 225
However, the Federal Circuit court denied this argument and
reasoned that Google’s use did not fit within the statutory categories
that are “looking to whether the use is for criticism, or comment, or
news reporting, and the like.”226 Also, the API packages “served the
same function in both works,”227 Google used the API packages for
the benefit of developers because the developers were “familiar with
the Java programming language.”228 Additionally, Google argued
that it used only thirty-seven out of 166 API packages to write its
own implementing code. 229 However, the court rejected Google’s
argument because the court reasoned that not only the quantity
matters, so did the quality of the copied material. 230 It did not matter
whether Google had its own original code in the Android platform;
the fact that Google failed to “alter[] the expressive content or
219

Id. at 1197 (quoting Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622,
627 (9th Cir. 2003)).
220
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1197.
221
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id. (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir.
2001)).
224
Id. at 1198.
225
Id. at 1199.
226
Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994)).
227
Order Denying JMOL, 2016 WL 3181206, at *8.
228
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
229
Id.
230
Id.
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message of the original work” was enough for the court to rule
against Google on this subfactor. 231 Finally, the court reasoned that
Google did not alter the original work by incorporating the API
packages because Java SE APIs were in smartphones before Android
entered the market.232 Thus, the court ruled in favor of Oracle on this
subfactor.233
The Federal Circuit used the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that “one
who acts in bad faith should be barred from invoking the equitable
defense of fair use.”234 Oracle argued that Google intentionally used
the API packages and knew that it needed to have a license. 235
Google argued good faith based on industry custom.236 The court
recognized that although bad faith may weigh against fair use, good
faith was not a defense. 237 Even if the jury found that Google’s use
was based on good faith, the court ruled in favor of Oracle on this
factor based on “the highly commercial and non-transformative
nature of the use.”238
For the nature of the copyrighted work factor, the court
evaluated “whether the work was informational or creative.” 239 As a
rule mentioned in Campbell, “[c]reative expression falls within the
core of the copyright’s protective purposes.” 240 The Federal Circuit
ruled in favor of Google on this factor because the evidence showed
only that the API packages had met the “minimal degree of
creativity”241 to be copyrightable; however, “the functional aspect of
the packages” was also an important consideration. 242 The evidence
had shown that the API packages were functional, and Oracle failed
to provide evidence explaining to the jury how to differentiate the
functionality and creativity. 243 However, the court also agreed with
231

Id.at 1201.
Id.
233
Id.at 1202.
234
Id. (quoting Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986)).
235
Id. at 1203.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id. at 1204.
239
Id. (quoting Worldwide Church of God v. Phila. Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d
1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2000)).
240
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
241
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1204.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 1205.
232
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the Ninth Circuit that this factor would not be very significant in the
whole fair use analysis. 244
For the amount and substantiality of the portion used factor,
the Federal Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit to evaluate both
“the quantitative amount and qualitative value of the original work
used in relation to the justification for its use.” 245 The quantitative
amount was not dispositive when the copied portion was significant
qualitatively.246 The court found that Google copied 11,330 more
lines than necessary to write in Java. 247 Google argued that it did so
to “avoid confusion among Java programmers as between the Java
system and the Android system.” 248 The court reasoned that use for
purposes of “capitalizing on the popularity of the copyrighted work
or to meet the expectations of intended customers” was not fair
use.249 The Federal Circuit explained that even if the quantity that
Google copied from Oracle’s copyrighted work was insignificant, no
reasonable jury could find that it was also qualitatively
insignificant.250 Google conceded it could have written the API
differently to achieve the same functions. 251 Thus, the court held that
this factor was at most neutral in the fair use inquiry. 252
For the effect upon the potential market factor, the Federal
Circuit evaluated the alleged infringer’s work’s potential market
impact.253 The Ninth Circuit ruled that market harm “can be
presumed where a use is ‘commercial and not transformative.’”254
The Supreme Court explained that this factor may be weighed

244

Id. (quoting Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1402 (9th Cir. 1997)).
245
Id. (quoting Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2013)).
246
Id.
247
Id. at 1206.
248
Order Denying JMOL, 2016 WL 3181206, at *10-11.
249
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1206-07.
250
Id. at 1207.
251
Id.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id. (quoting Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 861(9th Cir,
2017)).
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through a “sensitive balancing of interests.” 255 The Federal Circuit
applied the Supreme Court’s precedent. 256
When the court weighed this factor, the court evaluated both
impacts on actual or potential market impact and on the “market for
potential derivative uses, including those that creators of original
works would, in general, develop or license others to develop.” 257
The court recognized that “[l]icensing Java SE for smartphones with
increased processing capabilities” was one potential new market. 258
The fact that Oracle negotiated with Google about licensing also
indicated that Oracle intended to license its work.259 Google argued
that Java SE and Android did not compete in the same market; the
court disagreed, reasoning that the fact that Oracle never entered the
smartphone market was irrelevant here because the potential markets
included “licensing others to develop derivative works.”260 Even if
Google’s use did not have actual market harm, the potential impact
alone would suffice for the court to establish the market impact. 261
The Federal Circuit ruled Google infringed Oracle’s copyright
because its use was not fair use. 262 The first factor and the fourth
factor were heavily against Google.
In Google’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Google made
three arguments regarding the Federal Circuit court’s ruling in 2018
on the fair use issue. 263 First, Google pointed out that the Federal
Circuit failed to consider the functional nature of software
interfaces.264 Software interface, as a functional work, should be
easier to prove fair use because “interfaces lie ‘at a distance from the
255

Id. at 1208 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590
(1994)).
256
Id.
257
Id. (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. 569, 592).
258
Id. at 1209.
259
Id.; see Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1187 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Google and Sun tried to reach an agreement but failed, for Google wanted device
manufacturers to be able to use Oracle’s APIs in Android for free and to be able to
freely modify the code, which would jeopardize Java platform’s “write once, run
anywhere” philosophy. Id.
260
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1209-10.
261
Id. at 1210.
262
Id.
263
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11-32, Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc.,140 S.
Ct. 520 (2019) (No. 18-956).
264
Id. at 21.
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core’ of copyright protection and are owed ‘a lower degree of
protection than more traditional literary works.’”265 Second, Google
argued that the Federal Circuit applied “transformative use” too
rigidly.266 Google’s use was transformative because its use opened a
new market for smartphones.267 Google used Java API declarations
but only in a limited way to allow developers “to use the Java
language to build applications for Android.”268
Such
“interoperability was critical for developers” since they could make
progress without having to use “entirely different interfaces in
Android.”269 Finally, Google argued that the Federal Circuit erred in
reasoning that just because “Oracle could have tried to adapt Java SE
for use in smartphones, Google’s use … caused harm to a potential
market.”270
III.

ANALYSIS

On April 5, 2021, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. 271 and held that Google’s
copying was fair use. 272 The Supreme Court properly considered the
public benefit when applying the fair use doctrine, although it failed
to elaborate on its meaning. The Court also correctly held that
Google’s use was transformative, although it failed to provide a
definition of “transformative use.” The Court correctly and carefully
analyzed the market effect factor. The Supreme Court’s decision is
correct because it did not apply fair use to stifle creativity and
provided some clarification of the fair use application. The decision
will have a positive effect on the technology industry.

265

Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 24.
267
Id. at 25.
268
Id. at 25-26.
269
Id. at 26.
270
Id. at 29.
271
141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
272
Id. at 1209.
266
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The Supreme Court Correctly Incorporated the
Public Benefit into the Fair Use Analysis, but it
Failed to Provide A Detailed Analysis or Guideline
to the Public Benefit Consideration

In the Supreme Court decision, the Court incorporated the
public benefits consideration into the market effects factor, which is
the fourth factor.273 The Court noted that “[w]e do not say that these
questions are always relevant to the application of fair use. Nor do we
say that these questions are the only questions a court might ask. But
we do find them relevant here in helping to determine the likely
market effects of Google’s reimplementation.” 274
The Court,
however, failed to give it a deeper discussion.
The statutory language has provided that unauthorized use is
fair use “for the purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, or research.”275 Those enumerated uses have
one thing in common: the alleged infringer’s use provides societal
benefit far beyond the alleged infringer’s personal commercial
gain.276 Although it may be difficult for courts to value the external
benefit, the Constitution requires copyright to encourage the public
benefit.277
Before Google developed the Android system, there was “no
open-source, full-stack platform” in the smartphone market. 278
Google’s development of the Android system resulted in a
“revolutionary, open-source mobile platform, completely different
from any other approach.”279 Google then released the Android
system to smartphone manufacturers free of charge and published the
source code under an open-source license.280 Google’s use had a
threefold public benefit: first, it benefitted the smartphone
manufacturers so that the manufacturers do not have to buy
Android’s system. Second, it tremendously helped application
273

Id. at 1206.
Id.
275
17 U.S.C. § 107.
276
See Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in
An Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 49 (1997).
277
Id.
278
Brief of Defendant-Appellee, Oracle, 2017 WL 2305681 at *12 (May 22, 2017).
279
Id. at 16.
280
Id. at 17.
274
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developers so that they do not have to acquire more knowledge (such
as languages other than Java) to use Android and can use Android for
free. Third, the ease of using Android allowed application developers
to express their ideas better, thus, developing more valuable
applications that will be convenient for all smartphone users.
The number of Android smartphone users in the United States
increased to 120.5 million in 2018, and this figure is forecast to reach
more than 130 million in 2021,281 not to mention the number of
Android smartphone users across the world.282 If Google had
developed Android from scratch, Google might have taken longer or
even failed to successfully develop Android. If so, the smartphone
market, application developers, and Android smartphone users would
suffer a tremendous loss.
It is hard, however, to define or measure the public benefit.
What is the public benefit? What kind of use can have a public
benefit? What is the scope of public benefit? Does the use benefit
the public’s ability to be educated or enhance their ability to gain
commercially? Because we live in a digital world, the scope of
accessibility and the monetary value of the individual user is hard for
courts to measure. How many people can, have, or will use the
alleged copyright infringing software? Do they have to pay for using
it? These are the unsolved questions presented in front of the courts.
Courts may be reluctant to consider the public benefit because
every use could have some degree of public benefit. In that case, all
uses would be fair use, which would render the whole fair use
analysis meaningless. Further, if any usage that has some degree of
public benefit could be fair use, companies and developers would
have fewer incentives to put efforts into developing new software or
technology since their products may not be protected by copyright.
Moreover, although the statutory factors set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 107
are not exhaustive, courts are unwilling to go beyond the four factors
when considering the fair use defense.
S. O’Dea, Number of Android smartphone users in the United States from 2014
to
2021,
STATISTA
(Mar.
1,
2021)
https://www.statista.com/statistics/232786/forecast-of-andrioid-users-in-the-us/.
282
Allan Jay, Number of Smartphone and Mobile Phone Users Worldwide in
2021/2022:
Demographics,
Statistics,
Predictions,
FINANCESONLINE,
https://financesonline.com/number-of-smartphone-users-worldwide/ (last visited
Apr. 2, 2021).
281
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Although it may be difficult for courts to measure and apply
public benefit in the fair use analysis, this is not an excuse for courts
to disregard this consideration. The Supreme Court has previously
recognized the importance of the public benefit value when
determining the fair use defense. For example, the Court noted in
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken 283 that “[t]he limited scope
of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly … reflects a balance of
competing claims upon the public interest ….” 284 In Williams &
Wilkin Co. v. U.S.285 the Court noted that “[C]ourts in passing upon
particular claims of infringement must occasionally subordinate the
copyright holder’s interest in a maximum financial return to the
greater public interest in the development of art, science and
industry.”286 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc.287 the Court held that:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize
are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to
provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited
grant is a means by which an important public purpose
may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provisions of a special reward, and to allow the public
access to the products of their genius after the limited
period of exclusive control has expired. 288
Several Federal Circuits have also added the public benefit
consideration into the fair use analysis. For example, in Sega, the
Ninth Circuit considered the public benefit “resulting from a
particular use notwithstanding the fact that the alleged infringer may
283

422 U.S. 151 (1975).
See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (noting
that the ultimate goal of copyright is to stimulate artistic creativity for general
public good).
285
487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973)
286
Id. at 1352 (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publ’n, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d
303, 307 (2d Cir. 1966)).
287
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
288
Id. at 429; see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574-76
(1994) (directing courts to consider public benefits).
284
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gain commercially.”289 Additionally, public benefit “need not be
direct or tangible, but may arise because the challenged use serves a
public interest.”290 In Wright v. Warner Books, Inc.291 the Second
Circuit held that when considering the effect on the market, the court
must balance “the benefit the public will derive if the use is permitted
and the personal gain the copyright owner will receive if the use is
denied.”292 Another good example is the decision in Authors Guild v.
Google, Inc,293 where Google provided a searchable database of
books and snippet views so that the user could search for the books
but would not have access to the substantial book content. 294 At trial,
Judge Chin ruled in favor of Google and reasoned that:
In my view, Google Books provides significant public
benefits. It advances the progress of the arts and
sciences, while maintaining respectful consideration
for the rights of authors and other creative individuals,
and without adversely impacting the rights of
copyright holders. It has become an invaluable
research tool that permits students, teachers, librarians,
and others to more efficiently identify and locate
books. It has given scholars the ability, for the first
time, to conduct full-text searches of tens of millions
of books. It preserves books, in particular out-of-print
and old books that have been forgotten in the bowels
of libraries, and it gives them new life. It facilitates
access to books for print-disabled and remote or
underserved populations. It generates new audiences
289

Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (fitting
the public benefit consideration into the first fair use factor).
290
Id.; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (“[A]
search engine provides social benefit by incorporating an original work into a new
work, namely, an electronic reference tool.”); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d
811, 820 (holding that Arriba’s use of Kelly’s had public benefit by enhancing
internet’s information-gathering techniques).
291
953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991).
292
Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991); see also MCA,
Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) (fitting the public benefit
consideration into the fourth fair use factor).
293
804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
294
Id.
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and creates new sources of income for authors and
publishers. Indeed, all society benefits. 295
Although the Supreme Court reasoned that the public benefit
consideration was relevant in this case and incorporated the
consideration into the fourth factor, the Court failed to explain further
how the public benefit should be considered and analyzed. To make
it easier for lower courts to consider the public benefits properly, the
Supreme Court should have provided a more detailed analysis or
guideline to the public benefit consideration, or the Court should
have at least given a clear definition of public benefit.
B.

The Supreme Court Correctly Held that Google’s
Use is Transformative, but it Failed to Provide a
Clear Definition of “Transformative Use”

Transformative uses generally “involve the addition of labor
to create value, whether that labor is in building an interpretive
scaffold around a work, changing the work to send a different
message, or putting the work together with numerous other works in
order to search across them.”296 After Campbell, the lower courts
have split transformative use into two contexts: transformativecontent and transformative use.297 Transformative use means the
alleged infringer “transforms the original work for a new purpose.”298
Transformative content means the alleged infringer “uses part of the
original work to create a new meaning.” 299
For transformative purpose, changing the content in the alleged
infringer’s work is not necessary. Transformative purpose generally
295

Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 2013),
aff’d, 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Leval, supra note 124, at 1111 (noting
that the secondary use “adds value to the original” is the goal of enrichment of
society that the fair use doctrine intends to achieve).
296
Rebecca Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or Both, 90 WASH. L. REV. 869, 891-92
(2015).
297
Brief of Eight Intellectual Property Scholars as Amici Curiae supporting
Petitioner at 4, Google LLC v. Oracle Am. Inc, 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019) (No. 18-956).
298
Id.; see Tushnet, supra note 296, at 869-90.
299
Brief of Eight Intellectual Property Scholars as Amici Curiae supporting
Petitioner at 4, Google LLC v. Oracle Am. Inc, 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019) (No. 18-956);
see Tushnet, supra note 296, at 869-90.
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means that the defendant “has a different interpretive or
communicative project than the plaintiff did in creating the original
work.”300 Courts have held some uses infringe on copyright but are
fair use, even if the alleged infringer used the exact copy as originals.
For example, courts have held in some cases that using copyrighted
work in search engines is an allowable transformative purpose. In
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., the Second Circuit held that Google’s
searchable books had a transformative purpose for it “provide[s]
otherwise unavailable information about the originals.”301 The search
function’s purpose was for users to “gain significant information
about the books,” and the snippet view “adds importantly to the
highly transformative purpose of identifying books of interest to the
searcher.”302 In other cases, the courts ruled in favor of the alleged
infringer when it selectively copied the original works without
changing the content.303
However, the circuit courts disagreed over what constitutes
transformative use. For example, the Second Circuit held that “[t]o
qualify as a fair use under copyright law, a new work generally must
alter the original with new expression, meaning, or message.”304 In a
Ninth Circuit case, 305 the court agreed with the Second Circuit’s
300

Tushnet, supra note 296, at 878.
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d at 215; see also Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336
F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
302
Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d at 217-18.
303
Tushnet, supra note 296, at 877; see also Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling
Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); Am. Inst. of Physics v. Winstead PC
No. 3:12-CV-1230-M, 2013 WL 6242843 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 2013) (finding
patent-related copying a fair use and transformative); Denison v. Larkin, No. 1:14CV-01470, 2014 WL 3953637 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 2014) (finding that disciplinary
use had a different purpose than blogger’s purpose of exposing alleged courtroom
corruption).
304
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 705-08 (2d Cir. 2013); see The Andy Warhol
Foundation v. Goldsmith, 992 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2021) (holding that the artist’s print
illustration of musician based on the copyright owner photographer’s photo of the
musician was not transformative since it did not significantly alter or add any
elements).
305
Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A]n allegedly
infringing work is typically viewed as transformative as long as new expressive
content or message is apparent, this is so even where—as here—the allegedly
infringing work makes few physical changes to the original or fails to comment on
the original.”).
301
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approach and held that the junior work had to be transformative, even
though the junior work only minimally modified the original work.306
On the other hand, in a Seventh Circuit case, 307 the court criticized
the Second Circuit’s approach as being too broad and argued that it
would result in a conflict with the protection of derivative works
under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).308
The Federal Circuit in Oracle took the narrow view of
transformative use by only examining the statutory language and held
that Google’s use did not fall within the categories of “criticism, or
comment, or news reporting, and the like”309 mentioned in the statute.
However, the precedent cases demonstrated that the factors in § 107
never intended to be exhaustive. 310 The software code was written by
developers to achieve certain functions, which would almost never
fall within the categories listed in the statute. If courts apply this
narrow test and disregard the utilitarian nature of the software, it
would be difficult for software developers to use fair use as a
defense. Thus, the Federal Circuit’s holding was too narrow and
rigid since the court only looked at a few non-exhaustive categories
listed in the statute and failed to consider the functional nature of the
software.
Further, the Federal Circuit used the transformative content
test and held that Google’s use was not transformative since it failed
to “alter the expressive content or message of the original work.” 311
However, this holding “was against many precedent cases, which did
not focus on the work of the second creator.” 312 As an amicus curiae

306

Id. at 1176-78.
Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014) (questioning the
Second Circuit’s transformative use test set forth in Cariou because the test asks
exclusively whether the work is transformative and replaces the list in 17 U.S.C. §
107 and would also override derivative works protection set forth in 17 U.S.C. §
106(2)).
308
Id. at 758-59.
309
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-89 (1994).
310
Id. at 577-78.
311
Oracle, 886 F.3d at 1201.
312
See, e.g., Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[A
work is transformative] as long as new expressive content or message is
apparent . . . even where . . . the allegedly infringing work makes few physical
changes to the original.”).
307

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol37/iss2/16

38

Gao: Fair Use and Computer Programming

2021

FAIR USE AND COMPUTER PROGRAMMING

995

brief313 pointed out, “software interfaces allow developers to write
software that is interoperable and independent of the underlying
hardware.”314 It also noted that the developer community has its own
standard and universal practices to meet the tremendous need of
developing new software, such as rely on “libraries common software
function written by others” to avoid the need to recode, coordinate
with each other and “create interoperable code modules” that can be
connected to make the larger programming work, isolate the
hardware and software installed on it, and adopt a standardized
platform to bridge the gap between the hardware and software.315
Thus, under the Federal Circuit’s standard, software
developers would have to rewrite the code every time even to achieve
the same function. This would slow developers’ progress and thus
impede creativity. The Federal Circuit had thus failed to consider the
functional nature of the software and customary practices in the
software industry.
The Supreme Court reversed and held that Google’s use was
transformative.316 The Court noted that Google copied the portions
of APIs precisely for the purpose of “enabl[ing] programmers to call
up implementing programs that would accomplish particular
tasks.”317 The Court recognized that since it was the software
industry’s common practice, stopping the analysis here would
“severely limit the scope [of] fair use in the functional context of
computer programs.”318 Google uses APIs to create new products
and it seeks to “expand the use and usefulness of Android-based
smartphones.”319 The Court reasoned that Google’s use to “create a
new platform that could be readily used by programmers was
consistent with that creative ‘progress’ that is the basic constitutional
objective of copyright itself.”320 Google’s use is transformative
because Google “provided a new collection of tasks operating in a

313

Brief for Developers Alliance as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioner at 6,
Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc, 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019) (No. 18-956).
314
Id. at 5.
315
Id. at 6.
316
Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1204 (2021).
317
Id. at 1203.
318
Id.
319
Id.
320
Id.
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distinct and different computing environment.” 321 The Court also
recognized that Google’s reuse of APIs is also common in the
software industry as demonstrated by several of the amici briefs. 322
Although the Court made the correct decision that Google’s
use was transformative and rejected the narrow view of
transformative use taken by the Federal Circuit, the Court failed to
provide a clear standard and definition for what constitutes
“transformative use.” The lower courts would use their own
definition and standard of “transformative use,” which would cause
confusion and encourage judicial forum shopping. The best solution
for this dilemma is for the Supreme Court to provide a clearer
definition of “transformative use.” Otherwise, this unpredictable
issue will impair software developers’ creativity and give copyright
holders too much monopoly power, which consequently suppresses
expression and goes against copyright law’s purpose.
C.

Supreme Court Correctly Decided that Google did
not Harm Oracle’s Actual or Potential Market

Courts should not weigh the market impact factor (factor
four) too heavily. The software industry grows rapidly, and software
companies always want to explore and enter different markets to both
make profits and create new devices and processes to make people’s
lives more convenient. It is normal for software companies to make
efforts to enter new markets regardless of their success. Also,
software users are likely to use different types of software; each
software may serve various functions. Courts should not hold the
alleged infringer liable for copyright infringement merely because the
copyright owner attempts to enter the same market as the alleged
infringer and thus the alleged infringer impairs the original work’s
potential market. Otherwise, software companies may hesitate when
they decide to explore new markets. This may also give software
copyright holders monopoly power in certain markets, even if they do
not ever actually enter the market: they should not have “reserved” a
seat in the market.
In the Supreme Court’s decision, the Court held that Google
did not harm the markets for Java SE because Oracle failed to enter
321
322

Id.
Id at 1203-04.
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the smartphone market.323 Sun’s (now Oracle’s) main market was
laptops and desktops, and Sun “was poorly positioned to succeed in
the mobile phone market.”324 Google’s Android system was “part of
a distinct (and more advanced) market than Java software.” 325 Sun
failed to enter the smartphone market, which is a market that
“increasingly demanded a new form of smartphone technology.” 326
Finally, considering the difficulties to create similar APIs “with
similar appeal to programmers,” enforcing Oracle’s copyright would
actually harm the public. 327 As the Supreme Court recognized,
“Oracle alone would hold the key.” 328 Although Oracle as a
copyright holder could earn enormous profits, the profits “could well
flow from creative improvements, new applications, and new uses
developed by users who have learned to work with that interface.” 329
Enforcing Oracle’s copyright would limit creativity, which is
inconsistent with Congress’s intent. 330
The Supreme Court correctly decided not to grant Oracle
monopoly power. Technology grows fast and technology companies
use their best efforts to create new software and explore new fields
and markets. If a copyright owner holds the only “key,” this power
will have a negative impact on the technology companies’ creativity.
D.

Supreme Court Should Have Provided A Clear
Standard of Applying the Four Factors of the Fair
Use Defense and How to Weigh Them

The 17 U.S.C. § 107 enumerates only four non-exhaustive
factors when applying the fair use defense. However, it did not
provide guidelines for the relative weight of the four factors. So far,
the Supreme Court has adopted two approaches in evaluating the
factors. In Harper & Row, the Court stated that the fourth factor,
which required courts to “consider the effect on potential market,”

323

Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1206 (2021).
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325
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was “the most important element of fair use.” 331 On the other hand,
in Campbell, the Court introduced “transformative use” and held that
this was the key factor when deciding the fair use defense.332
Lower courts have struggled to reconcile the two standards.
For example, the Third Circuit held that Campbell rejected Harper,
and the correct way to apply fair use was to consider all aspects and
weigh the results together. 333 On the other hand, the Second Circuit
weighed the fourth factor as the most important factor. 334 The
Seventh Circuit held that the “transformative use” overlapped with
the “derivative work” test. 335 In the Ninth Circuit, both standards
were presented, and the court has never given a clear solution to
resolve this dilemma.336
As an amicus curiae brief written by eight intellectual
property scholars 337 supporting Google said:
This confusion exemplifies the clash between two
competing paradigms of fair use – “transformative
use” and “market-centered.” This Court’s Harper
holding stems from a “market-centered” view, which
tolerates limiting fair use when it “disrupts the
copyright market without a commensurate public
benefit.” In adopting the “transformative use” test in
Campbell, this Court accepted a broader vision for the
fair use standard first articulated by Judge Leval. But
by not doing so explicitly, the debate unnecessarily

331
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dragged on for more than twenty years, leaving behind
a trial of unpredictable decisions.338
The Supreme Court should have provided a clear standard of
how to apply the four factors of the fair use defense and how to
weigh those factors. “An intra-circuit split accompanied by an intercircuit divide followed by lack of conformity to a Supreme Court
decision normally warrants en banc review.” 339
When analyzing the four fair use factors, at least in the cases
involving the software industry, courts should consider the functional
nature of software and not the transformative content test but the
transformative purpose test. After all, computer code is “a set of
instructions that performs the same function whenever it is used.” 340
If courts focus on whether the alleged infringer altered the original
work’s content, the developers would have to develop new software
from scratch and cannot use something they already know to speed
up the process. The developers may thus lose incentive to create new
software, which will be contrary the copyright law’s goal to promote
progress.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Few cases have addressed the fair use defense issue in the
software area. Oracle v. Google, as the most important case in the
software area, will have a great impact on the technology industry.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Oracle correctly applied the fair use
doctrine because the Court did not apply the fair use doctrine
narrowly, and it protected the software developer’s creativity.
However, the Supreme Court should have provided a clear standard
for the fair use doctrine and discussed the standard in greater detail.
The clearer approach would make the result more predictable and not
impair software developers’ ability to express their ideas and develop
338
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339
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more convenient applications that can benefit humanity. It will also
make it easier for the lower courts to apply the fair use defense.
This Note does not call for the Supreme Court to provide a
bright-line fair use analysis, which would make the fair use defense
overly narrow and contrary to the legislative intent. Instead, this
Note agrees with the Supreme Court’s decision but calls for the Court
to go further and clarify ambiguities in the fair use doctrine. In this
way, the lower courts can focus more on the facts themselves when
applying the fair use defense instead of struggling with the
interpretation of the ambiguities.
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